Interview with Doug
Brown, NASA Communications Engineer, 2007-2011
Doug Brown worked as a NASA Cryptological Engineering Technician from 2007 to 2011. Like his father before him, who worked
at NASA during the Apollo program, Doug has always been passionate about space
travel. In our interview he observed that there are two types of NASA personnel
– those who came to NASA because it had been a lifelong dream, and those who
come into NASA as a springboard for better jobs in the private sector. The latter are largely the bureaucrats
and managers, the “bean counters” as he calls them, who have come to monopolize
NASA culture.
When did things change at
NASA? How did NASA become such a
complicated bureaucracy?
After the Apollo mission.
Nixon scrapped the last three moon landings to pour money into the shuttle
program. In the early days, NASA
envisaged not five shuttles but a fleet of dozens of them, running missions
every week. But there was a
five-year hiatus after Apollo, and there you had the first downsizing of
NASA. A lot of engineers who had
come up through the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs moved on to other jobs.
Then came these new guys who had less of a personal investment in space travel.
It was just a job to them. They didn’t have the “NASA spirit.” Then came the
contractors, as NASA began farming out work that it couldn’t afford to do
in-house. So naturally the org chart became more and more bizarre.
What was the
organizational culture like while you were working on the shuttle program?
It was very much a “cover
your ass” environment. We’d lost two shuttles, one on liftoff, the other on
re-entry. We’d learned from Columbia, but rather than improving communication
it only made people more skittish about accepting blame. We were experiencing more and more
budget pressures, and so the spirit of exploration was replaced by a relentless
focus on cost-effectiveness. NASA
had taken on the corporate mindset of the federal government.
Did NASA learn from the
mistakes of Columbia?
It did, but NASA tends to be
very reactionary rather than proactive.
Look at the Challenger disaster.
There were icicles hanging off the gantry, and yet they said, “let it
fly.” It costs something like half
a million dollars a day for the shuttle to sit on the launch pad, and the
people at the top constantly have that at the front of their mind. NASA learned
to take o-rings seriously after Challenger. Then came Columbia and NASA started putting cameras all over
the space station so that every time a shuttle docked it would get a complete
visual examination. They learned
their lesson. But they haven’t
always been good at looking ahead, to see problems before they become
catastrophes.
Regarding the Columbia
disaster, the CAIB in effect said, “The foam did it. . . . The institution
allowed it."
Yes, it was an
organizational problem, no doubt about it. The corporate mindset had taken over and suddenly it was the
managers, not the scientists, who were making the big decisions.
Has anything changed
since Columbia?
NASA really cleaned up its
act in 2008. They took the
bean-counters out of the way and put the scientists back in charge. The streamlined operations and got rid
of a lot of middlemen. They went back to the old way of promoting from within
and holding on to the people who had real passion. I was a lowly operations guy on the shuttle, but if
something didn’t add up, I had the ability to go to the flight director during
a mission and voice a concern.
Do you think we’ll ever
see a space program like we had in the 1960s?
In 1970, NASA’s budget was
around 3% of the total federal budget.
In 2010 it was around 1 1/4 % of the federal budget. And so much more is happening at NASA. It’s learning how to do more with
less. Space travel is one of the
noblest of human endeavors. There
will always be people who say: why spend so much on space exploration when
there are so many problems here at home?
But people don’t realize how many technological advances come out of the
space program. The problems you address in getting a manned mission to Mars
will translate into meaningful solutions here on Earth.
I would like to see more regarding his views on the organizational issues. His voice echoes millions that have came before him in a technical field with a manager that 'just doesn't get it.' I can see the value of having somebody completely committed to the program in charge though-especially if over the years the emergent culture has been a long term perspective. Do you think there has been a cheapening of the program? It almost seems that consumerism has infiltrated some of our more noble causes like NASA and it is all about producing something for the masses to chew on-CERN comes to mind. CERN seems to have been reliably producing 'results' the last few years that are holding the public's interest and NASA has failed to do the same.
ReplyDeleteHey Will,
ReplyDeleteDo you think NASA would have been better off if it had followed a more humanistic culture like Medtronic -- the idea that what they were doing benefited humanity and then been left to their own devices; or more of a bureaucratic and slow moving structure and culture, with even more structure support from the government, something more along the lines of P&G from the "Toward a theory of organizational culture and effectiveness?" It seems like they were trying to see-saw the two.
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ReplyDeleteWill,
ReplyDeleteHow fabulous that you were able to interview a former NASA employee for this week. Neato!
Mr. Brown describes NASA as a "cover your ass" environment. This quality is also made apparent in the CD-ROM materials we reviewed this week. Brown goes on to say that, instead of banding together in the wake of disaster, NASA employees just grow more concerned with self-preservation.
Justin mentions the humanistic nature of Medtronic's culture as outlined in the Denison and Mishra (1995) reading, suggesting that perhaps some of NASA's nobility of vision has been lost over time. I wondered about People Express Airlines, another subject company in the same study (Denison & Mishra, 1995).
People Express Airlines wanted to serve as a role model in its industry; much of its culture was built around this precept (Denison & Mishra, 1995). It occurs to me that NASA may not view itself as operating within an industry of peers. Sure, there are some other players in advanced physics and aeronautics (for example, Nik mentions CERN), but NASA doesn't really have "competitors" within the US that I know of. And why would they? Space exploration is a tremendously expensive business -- talk about barriers to entry!
Yet I wonder if NASA's position as king of its own mountain may have enabled a culture of limited accountability. Could this effect have trickled down to shape the every day behavior of employees in the organization?
King of its own mountain is a good way of putting it. I think the kingdom became too widespread and accountability too difuse for proper intra-organizational communication. Too much old-fashioned vertical function, not enough horizontal cross-departmental communication. Everyone seemed focus on his or her particular cog and not able to see the over-arching context.
DeleteWill, interesting interview and thoughtful comments by your classmates. It is great to get some background on the contractors because a few of our roles this week were not part of the formal NASA organization. Like Leslie, your interview also reminded me of the People Express Airlines example, but for a slightly different reason. In this organization, there were many subcultures - the flight attendants had one, the pilots another, etc. Like People Express, your interviewee mentions that some employees didn't have the "NASA spirit." During the live session we will discuss many of the issues your assignment mentions.
ReplyDeleteHe mentioned also that there were significant cultural differences between the senior engineers and the "grunts" who hadn't been with the org as long and didn't have the organizational memory. Columbia was a kind of rite of passage. If you came in post-Columbia, you were definitely in a different sphere from those who'd experienced that nightmare. So it seems there were cultures within cultures.
DeleteInteresting interview. I find his comment that they "put the scientists back in charge" interesting. It seems very simliar illustration to the Medtronic example, where there was once a "unity of purpose" (Denison & Mishra, 1995, p. 209) that disappeared and performance suffered.
ReplyDeleteTwo things happened simultaneously -- the scientists were put back in charge AND financial accountability became paramount: doing more with less. How they managed to do both is a marvel, but Doug was very upbeat about the postive changes he saw during his tenure.
DeleteInteresting that he mentioned the "NASA spirit" and how it was diluted by contractors. Do you think that this was soley a personnel issue or existing management to blame, too? Audrey mentioned a Google intern on Paul's post who was turned into a "Google person" through a strong corporate culture. Do you believe that strong management/culture could've gotten these new workers on board and in sync with the NASA of old?
ReplyDeleteI don't know if stronger management/culture would have achieved that. Sometimes it's an oil and water scenario, and never the two shall mix. It reminds me of the present-day military. Much of the work once done by soldiers is now done by contractors, and there is absolutely no military spirit among these contractors. They're in it for the money and have no interest in military objectives. The two orbs come close (at the mess hall, for instance) but never converge. NASA was probably not this bad, but I can see the similarity -- those with a mission and those looking for a rung on the ladder.
ReplyDelete