Phillip - Week 7 Post

In the wake of the Enron debacle, companies scrambled to maintain a level of investor confidence and distinguish themselves as companies that looked to put the needs of the investor along with the bottom line (Allen, 206). One of those investor needs is the communication of corporate social responsibility (Hockert & Moir, 85).

Some investors are not only looking at the bottom line, i.e. the returns on their investments, but "also a certain type of social performance" (Hockert & Moir, 85).  Not only do investors want to know how financially solvent a company is by looking at certain indexes and ratios as we've learned through out readings, but people want to invest in companies that place the same high value on certain social issues as the general public might, such as environmental causes.

While companies wonder how they can restore investor confidence (Allen, 86), one answer is by communicating how socially responsible they are, thus, expanding the role of the Investor Relations team (Hockert & Moir, 86). As more investors look to CSR as a key factor in the decision-making process, IR departments have been able to identify 3 different types of Socially Responsible Investors (SRI):

1. Those who invest in companies on the basis that the more good a company does the more value the company has

2. Those who choose not to consider investing in questionable/controversial companies such as arms dealers, tobacco companies, etc.

3. Those investors looking to "stimulate change" through "shareholder engagement"
     (Hockerts & Moir, 86)

The above investor types may not have existed in the past, especially before the Enron collapse. However, a survey conducted after the Enron collapse showed that 43% of active investors had "less confidence in the stock market following Enron. Further, 88 percent believe Enron executives, board, auditors or attorneys intentionally misled the public" (Allen, 206). 

Companies now have more work to do when attracting investors, including showing how socially responsible they are.

References

Allen, C. (2002) Building Mountains in a Flat Landscape: Investor Relations in the post-Enron Era, Corporate Communications: An International Journal, Volume 7 (2), pp. 206-211                       

Hockert, K., Moir, L. (2004). Communicating Corporate Responsibility to Investors: The Changing Role of the Investor Relations Function, Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 52 (1), pp. 85-98

Week seven - Brian

Adidas recently unveiled a new shoe that featured a clip-on shackle, similar to those commonly associated with prison and more disturbingly, slavery. The shoe sparked controversy, was deplored by the public and as a result, the company found itself facing the wrath of outraged consumers and high-profile civil rights activists, eventually nixing plans to release it. In response to continuing backlash, Adidas initially defended the shoes, but issued a public apology soon after (Sterlin, 2012).

In her Washington Post column, Sterlin (2012) doubts Adidas’ commitment to corporate responsibility and questions the company’s motive for releasing a shoe that harkens back to such a negative snapshot of American history. She alludes to the fact that Adidas’ motive in creating the shoe was to make a splash and boost sales (Sterlin 2012); the company’s lack of regard and/or planning for the social ramifications that followed the announcement resulted in negative press, more resources spent in public relations efforts, and potentially damaged its reputation (Porter and Kramer, 2006).  

Sterlin (2012) mentions the importance of good will in business and how it takes a long period of time to develop rapport with the public. Last year, Adidas found itself in another situation that shook that rapport when it unveiled the new jerseys for the All Blacks, rugby-crazy New Zealand’s national team, to be worn in the Rugby World Cup. Following the unveil, New Zealand fans realized that the jerseys were being sold online in the United States for around half the price that New Zealanders paid locally. After the initial wave of fan outrage, Adidas directed Internet stores to remove New Zealand from their delivery options, sparking a higher level of public angst. Adidas refused to lower jersey prices in New Zealand and retailers began discounting them and absorbing the price inflation, leaving only small profits to be made. The situation captured the attention of government officials and eventually, Adidas apologized (Hutchinson, 2011).  This is another example of Adidas engaging in short-term, socially damaging behavior in search of short-term benefits (Porter and Kramer, 2006) while ignoring potential long-term, negative effects.

Although both of these blunders resulted in negative public attention, it is yet to be seen how they will impact brand perception. Porter and Kramer (2006, p. 4) state that “the vehemence of a stakeholder group does not necessarily signify the importance of an issue – either to the company or to the world,” and it seems that Adidas recognizes this, however, when the vehemence of multiple stakeholder groups begin to span the world, I would assume that a certain level of importance is eventually achieved.

References

Hutchinson, J. (2011, August 24). The price of jerseys sets rugby fans against Adidas. New York Times. Retreived June 28, 2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/sports/rugby/adidas-angers-all-blacks-fans-with-price-policy.html?_r=4&pagewanted=all

Porter, M., Kramer, M. (2006). Strategy & society: The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 1-15.

Sterlin, S. (2012, June 26). Business advice: Lessons in social responsibility from the Adidas “shackle shoe.” Washington Post. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small-business/business-advice-lessons-in-social-responsibility-from-the-adidas-shackle-shoe/2012/06/26/gJQAvWG44V_story.html

Week 5 - Phillip

I found the article The Strategic Communication Imperative (Argenti, Howell and Beck) very insightful when it came to looking at how our group would proceed with a Communication Analysis. But it wasn't until looking over the chart (Argenti, Howell & Beck, 87) and analyzing our group's stakeholders where I saw a lot of overlap in the various communications activities for targeted constituencies, especially in the Public Relations and Philanthropy activities.


The article, Differences between public relations and corporate social responsibility: An analysis by Cynthia E. Clark, focuses on these two aspects of corporate communication and compares them, providing a timeline as to how both Public Relations and CSR evolved throughout the years from the 1920's and beyond (Clark). 


The 1973 Texas Gulf Sulfur case concluded in a ruling that forced businesses to disclose any information that could effect it's stock to other investors, which helped lead to major efforts in the field of corporate social responsibility (Clark).


Our class article indicated that Public Relations objectives were relegated to all constituents and the media while Community Relations focused on image building objectives for communities, media and non-governmental organizations (Argenti, Howell & Beck, 87). 


As our group attempted to analyze stakeholders and develop a communications analysis, Clark adds a step and calls this the Communications Management Approach, in which she "uses the knowledge of identifying stakeholder groups and a corporation's responsibility to them with the ability to strengthen these relationships through effective communication" (Clark). 

Clark concludes that the connection between Public Relations and CSR is still developing and that "this connection suggests that public relations and CSR have similar objectives; both disciplines are seeking to enhance the quality of the relationship of an organization among key stakeholder groups" (Clark, 380).


References


Argenti, P., Howell, R., Beck, K. (2005) The Strategic Communication Imperative, MIT Sloan Management Review, 46 #3, pp. 83-89 


Clark, C. (2000) The difference between public relations and corporate social responsibility: An analysis, Public Relations Review, 26 #3, pp. 363-380

Week 5 - Cynthia

Sellnow and Ulmer (2000) offer a case study of the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak; their study examined the ethical implications of strategic ambiguity in a crisis communications situation.  As background, in 1993, several children became ill with E. coli in the northwest U.S., hundreds were sickened and several small children died (Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000).  Jack in the Box hamburgers were implicated as the cause, consequently, Jack in the Box stock plunged as the company looked to identify causes of the outbreak (Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000). 

Sellnow and Ulmer’s (2000) research examined the language used by the company with the media during the crisis and the company’s testimony delivered by its president before a U.S. Senate subcommittee.  They found that in that testimony, the president uses ambiguous language interpreted as an effort to escape sole blame for the incident.  His language includes, “not solely responsible,” suggests that government standards, “didn’t reach his office…” and similar language to deflect direct responsibility (Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000, p. 150).   

This article offered a unique perspective on this week’s assigned readings, where strategic ambiguity is offered as a powerful tool that organizations can deploy to accomplish organizational goals (Eisenberg, 1984).  Eisenberg cautions against the use of ambiguity for

In this case, Jack in the Box used strategic ambiguity not to “…foster agreement on abstractions without limiting specific interpretations” (Eisenberg, 1984, p 231), but to avoid making statements that could be used in litigation by individuals affected by the E. coli.  Sellnow and Ulmer (2000) conclude that Jack in the Box used strategic ambiguity to favor financial stakeholders over others, and in this manner, strategic ambiguity was used unethically (p. 149).  

References

Eisenberg, E. M.  (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 227-242.

Sellnow, T., & Ulmer, R., (2000).  Consistent questions of ambiguity in organizational crisis communication: Jack In the Box as a case study. Journal of Business Ethics, 25. 143-155.

Week 5 by Justin

Ambiguity as a strategy does seem a bit obvious – especially when you think about politics, king making, and ruling leaders throughout history, and does anyone really understand what antiquity-period Greeks and Romans were talking about, possibly the best at ambiguity? Finding the article “Ambiguity as a Communication Strategy in the WCTU: National and North Dakota” (Wurtz, 1995) though, an article about the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) using ambiguity as strategy in the early part of the 20^th century, seemed out of place. It seemed out of place because it’s easy to think of the rigidity of that era. It may be out of place as the definition of ambiguity as strategy is more current, and that the WCTU may have been ahead of its time.

One of the strategies he WCTU, according to Wurtz (1995, p. 35-36), used was letter writing in its recruitment of new members. WCTU members were encouraged to use their ideas and language to attract new members (Wurtz, 1995). Thus, members were able to learn and use the best methods for those they were targeting. It also demonstrates that the WCTU knew that no matter how they reached their audience, they knew they were reaching their audience, and that would allow the audience to think for themselves and draw their own conclusions, like they knew that communication is in context (Eisenberg, 1984, p. 229).

This ambiguity is in line with Eisenberg’s (1984, p. 229) “relativist position:” Ideas were decided by WCTU communicators, and those the WCTU targeted were left to interpret the message and decide if they wanted to join.

Wurtz writes that messages are not written literally and allow for those that receive them to interpret them how they wish (1995, p. 36), and that this allowed the WCTU greater access at recruiting and influencing. This ambiguity in communication allowed the WCTU to communicate and relate with the variety of people that is America – the South in the early 20^th century was much different than the Northeast.

It’s as if the WCTU were following Goodall, Trethewey, and McDonald’s (2006, p. 10) “five pragmatic principles to guide policy,” that they knew to “engage” instead of sell their ideas, let their message be delivered from a variety of sources while expecting different results, that they didn’t understand everyone from every corner of the U.S., that understanding is more about “a function of relationships” than using the correct words, and that you can unify through diversity if you have a shared and common interest and that it is better to bring people together for a positive (influence change) than a negative (complain and do nothing).

Wurtz writes that the WCTU used their ambiguity and “storytelling” (1995, p. 36-37) to grow the organization, using stories to attract new members. The way that Wurtz describes the use of “storytelling” makes it sound like the WCTU knew how to create a club that a woman would want to join, therefore making it sound important and prestigious so that it could achieve its goals and be successful. 

References

Eisenberg, E. (1984) Ambiguity As Strategy In Organizational Communication, Communication Monographs, 51, pp.227-242 (full article).

Goodall, B., Terthewey, A., and McDonald, K. (2006) Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices, Consortium for Strategic Communication, pp. 1-14 (full article).

Wurtz, L. (1995). Ambiguity as a communications strategy in the WCTU: national and North Dakota. North Dakota Journal of Speech & Theatre. 8(1), 34-42.

Week 5 post by Andrew

This week’s readings on strategic communication, particularly the concept of strategic ambiguity illustrated by Eisenberg (1984), struck a chord with me, especially when considering when strategic ambiguity might be employed and considered useful and even ethical.

When Eisenberg explains “clarity is only a measure of communicative competence if the individual has as his or her goal to be clear” (p. 230), it made me wonder about instances where a lack of clarity might be the goal.

As communicators, we have a duty to first determine the goal of our communication before planning and executing a strategy. If hypothetically, in a crisis situation, there is so little information we know that being ambiguous is not the same as being evasive, is a goal to “continuously monitor the situation,” a phrase often heard from communicators in these sorts of situations, ethically reasonable or merely a case of blame-shifting?

Paul & Strbiak (1997) provide us with a framework to make these decisions. Their work focuses on three key elements whose congruence or incongruence determines the ethics of strategic ambiguity: behavior, espoused-ethics and ethics-in-use (p. 153). While the ideal situation ethically is for all three of these to be congruent, there is one possible situation where the communicator can have incongruence and still be considered ethical: if the behavior matches up with the espoused-ethics.

Consider the hypothetical situation outlined above. Our espoused-ethics are to provide the best, most clear information possible, but if our ability to do so is cloudy and we act on our best knowledge, is this still considered ethical? Paul & Strbiak might argue that this is correct, as our “continuously monitor the situation” holding statement behavior matches up with these espoused-ethics.

In fact, they say just this: “Strategic ambiguity is ethical when communicative behaviors are congruent with communicators’ rational, logically consistent espoused-ethics” (p. 157) What I find most interesting about this argument is that the decision to utilize strategic ambiguity does not become unethical in and of itself; the much larger question regards the communicators’ (and organization’s) ethics and whether there is a rationale and logic behind it or not. In other words, if our hypothetical crisis were occurring and we kept with a holding statement, it would be ethical as it falls in line with our overarching goal of informing as most possible.

I am interested to hear what my fellow students think about this link between ethics and strategic ambiguity. Is it enough to simply communicate the information on hand, in the vein of “first, do no harm,” or is there an ethical imperative to communicate “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?”

References

Argenti, P. A., Howell, R. A., & Beck, K. A. (2005). The strategic communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3), 83-89.

Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 227-242.

Paul, J., & Strbiak, C.A. (1997) The ethics of strategic ambiguity. Journal of Business Communication, 34(2), 149-159. 

Nik Gurney Week 5

In researching for my 540 intro paper I came across an interesting article that addresses the sincerity-hypocrisy spectrum in CSR communication. Fassin and Buelens (2012) argue that there is a short circuit between the rhetoric surrounding CSR and its actual implementation. This establishes the need for a rating system to evaluate an organization’s actual performance in CSR versus the rhetoric surrounding it. They review the current state of CSR communication, give examples of rhetoric and outline a rating system to better evaluate the actual worth of an organization’s CSR activities. One example of CSR gone wrong they share is Phillip Morris spending $108 million to promote charitable contributions of $60 million (Fassin & Buelens, 2012, pp.592-593).   As I read about ambiguous communication I could not help but think what role does it play in CSR rhetoric? I am inclined to believe that Phillip Morris took every action it could to hide the fact it was spending more promoting its good deeds than actually doing them (and being as ambiguous as possible.) For Phillip Morris this was likely the best strategic communication practice feasible, and yet I suspect that the vast majority of people would find it reprehensible.

In their closing argument, Bonini, Mendonca and Oppenheim assert the approach they have argued will allow businesses to, “…shape the social contract and identify ways of creating value from the opportunities and risks arising from sociopolitical issues” (2006, p.31). While reading this article I kept getting the impression that the authors are suggesting the most important reason for an organization to take part in sociopolitical issues is financial, and I can see how an organization like Phillip Morris would take this to its logical, albeit morally questionable, end. If financial benefits are the real reason to pursue sociopolitical involvement then, at least from a rational perspective, Phillip Morris’ actions are justifiable and perhaps we all need to change our moral compass settings. Phillip Morris was engaging in the sociopolitical dialogue then “creating value” as Bonini et al. stated. I stand to disagree with this argument though, and I think Eisenberg would agree. He comments, “…the effectiveness and the ethics of any particular communicative strategy are relative to the goals and values of the communicators in the situation” (1984, p.239). Phillip Morris’ actions reflect a negative view of the communication consumers. Now I suppose that if this was never discovered the only damage done (and it is probably the worst case scenario, but that is another discussion…) would be the consumers putting too much faith in Phillip Morris as a social actor. Of course Phillip Morris was found out and their credibility was damaged. As Argenti, Howell and Beck point out credibility is very important to an organization, and has been lost for much of corporate America (2005) not just Phillip Morris. This is why a scale similar to what Fassin and Buelens prescribe is so valuable (2012). Before an organization chose to implement communication strategies, especially ambiguous ones, it would be in its best interest to run the rhetoric through an analysis to see possible interpretations and where each one lies on the sincerity-hypocrisy scale.

I am not arguing against Goodall, Trethewey and McDonald’s third principle (2006) and looking for control of the message, but rather suggesting we be more cognitive of the messages we could possibly convey. Of course this becomes more natural as the relationship is developed, just like they assert in the fourth principle.

I am not going to say I am perfect either—far from it—but for whatever reason the idea of being purposefully ambiguous seems detrimental to any relationship from a long term perspective and I strive to avoid it. It is analogous the husband telling his rotund wife she looks beautiful (not fat) in the new dress. It is lip service at best. I personally believe in being transparent in your communication, and should a situation arise where ambiguous communication seems necessary then it is time to seriously consider your position, maybe even reevaluate why you’re in business.

References

Argenti, P., Howell, R., Beck, K. (2005) The Strategic Communication Imperative, MIT Sloan Management Review, 46 #3, pp. 83-89 (full article)

Bonini, S. M. J., Mendonca, L., and Oppenheim, J. (2006) When Social Issues Become Strategic, The McKinsey Quarterly, 2, pp. 19-31 (full article)

Fassin, Y., & Buelens, M. (2011). The hypocrisy-sincerity continuum in corporate communication and decision making: A model of corporate social responsibility and business ethics practices. Management Decision, 49(4), 586-600.

Goodall, B., Terthewey, A., and McDOnald, K. (2006) Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices,Consortium for Strategic Communication, pp. 1-14 (full article)

Eisenberg, E. (1984) Ambiguity As Strategy In Organizational Communication, Communication Monographs, 51, pp.227-242 (full article)

Brian Bleau - Week Five

Strategic Communication and National Security

Joint Force Quarterly

After reading Stavridis’ (2007) journal article, I thought that it would be most valuable to focus on one particular case study mentioned regarding a strategic communication plan launched by the Department of Defense (DOD) in response to allegations of torture during force-feeding operations at the Guantanamo Bay detention and interrogation facility.

In 2005, detainees began a “large, coordinated hunger strike” (Stavridis, 2007, p. 4) and were eventually locked into restraint chairs and force fed through tubes inserted through their nostrils down to their stomachs; allegations of torture surfaced shortly after (Stavridis, 2007).

The DOD has a policy of preserving life, and in the view of Guantanamo Bay officials, force-feeding operations were a necessary response to life-threatening emergencies (Stavridis, 2007). Following implementation of these procedures, the DOD experienced significant, unforeseen negative public response, especially in regard to the restraint chair, which was called “torture,” yet was an essential part of the feedings (Stavridis, 2007) to ensure the safety of everyone involved. As Bonini et all (2006, p. 21) stated, social and political forces “can alter an industry (or in this course, an organization’s) strategic landscape fundamentally.” In this case, social forces did just that. 

In response to public outcry, misrepresentation of the procedure and the bad press that came with it, the DOD was forced to reevaluate its communication tactics and implement a strategic communication plan to offset the growing belief that it was being deceptive (Stavridis, 2007).  As part of this plan, the DOD:

·      Invited distinguished physicians to observe force-feeding procedures. These physicians then published credible journal articles on the procedure.

·      Stressed importance of saving human lives and the fact that identical procedures were used in accredited prisons. These became key messages.

·      Made facility officials available to the media, making the process and organization more transparent.

Additionally, the procedure was performed, voluntarily, of course, on the task force joint commander so he could accurately and appropriately speak to the fact that it was not torture (Stavridis, 2007), increasing credibility and gaining approval and trust of message recipients (Argenti et all, 2005). Eventually, negative publicity dwindled and detainees began voluntarily eating again (Stavridis, 2007).

In this case, the DOD used an integrated approach to strategic communications involving media relations, employee communications, community relations and government relations to accomplish its goal of calming public outrage and negative press (Stavridis, 2007, Argenti et all, 2005) and by involving senior management, in this case, the joint commander (Argenti et all, 2005) credibility was improved among constituents and the media, leading to a small victory in an ongoing battle to shape public opinion (Stavridis, 2007).

References

Argenti, P., Howell, R., Beck, K. (2005). The strategic communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3), 83-89.

Bonini, S.M.J., Mendonca, L., Oppenheim, J. (2006). When social issues become strategic. The McKinsey Quarterly, 2, 19-31.

Stavridis, J. (2007). Strategic communication and national security. Joint Force Quarterly, 46, 4-7.

Week 5 post by Will

Strategic Ambiguity in U.S. Messaging in Afghanistan

At dawn on Halloween morning, October 31, 2011, a coordinated insurgent attack was launched against our compound in Kandahar City, one involving rocket-propelled grenades, suicide bombers and the detonation of a vehicle-borne IED outside the compound wall. The breach was unsuccessful, leading to a six-hour gun battle between the insurgents and our security team. Five Afghan civilians died in the attack. None of our personnel were wounded.

While the attack was still ongoing, the following press release appeared on the Taliban’s Voice of Jihad website:

KANDAHAR, Oct. 31 – Officials from Kandahar state that the fighting which erupted this morning when a number of martyrdom-seeking Mujahideen entered the IRD building of foreign invaders after blowing away all security barriers with a truck bomb is still ongoing.

The martyrdom-seeking Mujahideen add that they initially went to each of the rooms in the building, killing all the enemy personnel inside using their weapons and even machetes, and after a long while took up positions inside the building and targeted the enemy troops arriving for reinforcement.

According to witnesses, the IRD building has also been badly damaged by the powerful blast, bringing down a number of rooms as well as destroying and damaging the enemy military and logistical vehicles inside.

None of this happened, of course. But the report was erroneously carried by several news outlets during the first hours of the attack and picked up on numerous Tweets, creating the desired local chaos and misinformation.

As noted by Goodall et al. (2006), “the jihadi media and message strategy … has thus far dominated local cultural interpretations of U.S. diplomatic objectives” (p. 4). The authors go on to suggest that strategic ambiguity may serve as an antidote to the growing proliferation of jihadi media.

One example of strategic ambiguity that I’ve noted in my work here is expressed in two of the authors’ Principles to Guide Policy: Do not seek to control a message’s meaning in cultures we do not fully understand and Focus diplomatic efforts on building trust and credibility.  The mission in Afghanistan is one of stabilization, creating an environment upon which a thriving economy can be built and legitimate governance can flourish. To achieve this aim, U.S. stabilization efforts reach out to farmers, who comprise 80% of the Afghan workforce. Messaging is critical, but the approach is not one of building American prestige so much as buttressing the Afghan government. In other circumstances, American intervention is clearly labeled: From the American People. Here, no such branding takes place. American relief is directed through Afghan governmental channels to help build confidence in the Afghans for their government. By giving credit to the Afghan government, taxpayer-funded relief may not win the hearts of Afghans to the American cause, but it achieves the strategic goal of building stabilization, which is in the American interests.

Previous efforts to inculcate goodwill through pro-American propaganda have failed miserably here, serving as illustrations of the disconnect between message content and receiver interpretation as noted by Eisenberg (1984). And the jihadi movement will no doubt continue to be relentless in its own rollout of propaganda. But strategic ambiguity—in this case, routing the messaging indirectly through Afghan channels—might possibly hold the key to longer-term solutions in a country where messaging is so easily mishandled and where trust is so hard-won.

-----------------------

Reference:

Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 227-242.

Goodall, B., Terthewey, A., and McDonald, K. (2006) Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices. Consortium for Strategic Communication, report #604, 1-14

Week 5 post by Leslie

I was struck this week by the tension between clarity and ambiguity in our readings. I know there are valuable lessons to be learned from Eisenberg's "strategic ambiguity" approach (1984), but dethroning clarity as king is a bitter pill to swallow. Like many of you, I was taught to write with a focus on precision and clarity; the underlying precept was that a "good" writer can control interpretation of his or her messages.

Did you notice that even our selected readings this week failed to reach a consensus on the subject? I've indicated some passages that illustrate this discord in the table below:

FROM CLARITY & REPETITION...

...TOWARD AMBIGUITY & DIVERSITY

The executives interviewed by Argenti, Howell, and Beck describe "clarity and consistency of message" as critical components of strategic communications (2005, p. 87) Ted French, Executive VP and CFO of Textron, opines that "communications now have to be crisper and give more clarity" (Argenti, Howell, & Beck, 2005, p. 86) Textron CEO Lewis Campbell calls for "a coordinated communications effort" that involves communicating "all the time with the same message" (Argenti, Howell, & Beck, 2005, p. 85) Argenti, Howell, and Beck agree that "repetition is ... crucial," going on to quote FedEx CFO Alan Graf as saying "you almost can't communicate a message frequently enough"(2005, p. 87)

Eisenberg rejects models of communication "which equate effectiveness with clarity and openness" (1984, p. 227), reasoning that clearly-stated organizational goals "are often strikingly ineffective" (1984, p. 231) Instead, Eisenberg prefers the intentional use of ambiguity "to allow for multiple interpretations to exist among people" (1984, p. 231) Goodall, Tretheway, and McDonald specifically advise against the practice of repetition (2006) Rather than repeat the same messages, Eisenberg suggests communicators diversify messages "along the spectrum from explicitness to indirection" depending on the audience and circumstances (1984, p. 228)

Yet a careful reading of Eisenberg's article reveals that clarity and strategic ambiguity are not truly dichotomous concepts. Rather, we must change the way we think about clarity. I believe what Eisenberg is rejecting as futile is a fanatical devotion to clarity as a mechanical exercise. Goodall, Tretheway, and McDonald put it very well: "message clarity and perception of meaning is a function of relationships, not strictly a function of word usage" (2006, p. 11).

For my blog entry this week, I wanted to share with you some highlights from a recent (May 2012) interview with Eisenberg that was conducted here in my home city of Atlanta. Interviewer Barry Mike notes that the corporate landscape has changed considerably in the almost 30 years since Eisenberg first put forward his notion of strategic ambiguity.

Today, in a world in which the language of ambiguity, “plausible deniability” and selective disclosure has been used to mask ethical lapses, fiduciary irresponsibility and outright malfeasance, there is a growing hue and cry for openness and transparency.

In that context, we decided to take advantage of an opportunity to revisit Professor Eisenberg’s original insights with him, and look at whether they remained relevant in a very different world from the one in which they originated. (Mike, 2012)

In the brief interview, Eisenberg shares several illuminating, real-world examples of why strategic ambiguity makes sense as a communication management approach. He says ambiguity has an "important role in maintaining relationships" (Mike, 2012),  citing the examples of providing tactful feedback to employees or vendors. And Eisenberg's endorsement of using strategic ambiguity to communicate an organization's vision and mission has even greater teeth now than it did in 1984 thanks to today's increasingly global corporation with its "different groups in different parts of the world having different goals and speaking different languages" (Mike, 2012).  Eisenberg even provides several examples of strategic ambiguity in the political arena, including President Obama's famous "yes, we can" slogan (Mike, 2012).

One exchange in the interview may deserve further discussion. Eisenberg addresses the impact of a Web-enabled "24/7 news cycle" on strategic ambiguity, acknowledging that while communicators need to tailor messages to fit different audiences, "what you say to one audience will be quickly picked up by lots and lots of other audiences" (Mike, 2012). Eisenberg's only answer to this problem? Communicate with still greater ambiguity.

References

Argenti, P. A., Howell, R. A., & Beck, K. A. (2005). The strategic communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(3), 83-89.

Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 227-242.

Goodall, B., Trethewey, A., & McDonald, K. (2006, June 21). Strategic ambiguity, communication, and public diplomacy in an uncertain world: Principles and practices. Paper presented at the Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ.

Mike, B. (2012, May). Openness and clarity are overrated: An interview with professor Eric Eisenberg. Conducted at the Communication Leadership Exchange Annual Conference, Atlanta, GA. Retrieved from http://strategicleadershipcommunication.com

Week 5: Paul

BenQ, Siemens and Poor Communication

BenQ, a Taiwanese electronics company acquired the German mobile phone division of Siemens (Cheng & Seeger, 2012). The result of the merger was failure in less than a year, because of large financial losses. A major contributing factor to the failure was inadequate communication between the stakeholders and a lack of sensitivity to the cultural issues involved. This inadequate communication centered around a lack of clearly defining goals and objectives during the merger process (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

Good communication is the key to the success of any corporate merger (Appelbaum, Lefrancois, Tonna & Shapiro, 2007). A major complicating factor can be when each contributor to the merger speaks different languages (Cheng & Seeger, 2012). Language differences can greatly increase the time it takes for communication to work well and also increase the expenses involved in the merger (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

The source of communications involved in any significant change within a business (in this case, a merger) must come from the proper source. "... senior executives will see the demonstrated value that communications brings to the implementation of strategy and will recognize the critical role they must play in that effort" (Argenti, Howell, & Beck, 2005). In German culture, communication from the top is more critical than in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese leaders did not take this into account in their strategy (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

Communication needs to be appropriate. Many times, what is not said is just as important as what is said. Eisenberg refers to this as "strategic ambiguity" (1984, p. 227). Communications from the leadership on both sides involved in the merger should have used "less than explicit language, being purposefully vague, and leaving key meanings implicit" (Eisenberg, 1984, p. 231). This would have allowed a more accurate level of expectations on the part of the workers. The leadership may have promised more than they were able to deliver. They certainly overpraised to all stakeholders expecting financial returns as a result of the merger (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

Balancing the need to minimize unneeded communications is the need to communicate vial information to the stakeholders in a merger (Appelbaum, Gandell, Yortis, Proper, & Jobin, 2000). Within the BenQ/Seimens merger, poor communication resulted in a lack of trust on the part of employees (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

Congruency in messaging is vital. Communications to both internal and external stakeholders must be the same (Argenti, et al., 2005). The BenQ/Seimens merger was fraught with a lack of congruent communication (Cheng & Seeger, 2012).

A major lesson from that the BenQ/Seimens failed merger is that "companies from different cultures considering a merger need to prepare in advance a strategic communication plan" (Cheng & Seeger, 2012, p. 126). That strategy should have included adequately communicating both financial and organizational goals (Argenti, et al., 2005), which would have moderated the level of unmet expectations.

References:

Cheng, S. & Seeger, M. (2012). Cultural differences and communication issues in international mergers and acquisitions: A case study of BenQ debacle. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(3), 116-127.

Appelbaum, S., Lefrancois, F., Tonna, R., & Shapiro, B. (2007). Mergers 101 (part one): training managers for communications and leadership challenges. Industrial and Commercial Training 39(3). 128-136.

Argenti, P., Howell, R., & Beck, K. (2005). The strategic communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management Review, Spring. 83-89.

Eisenberg, E. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monongraphs, 51. 227-242.

Appelbaum, S., Gandell, J., Yortis, H., Proper, S., & Jobin, F. (2000). Anatomy of a merger: behavior of organizational factors and processes throughout the pre- during- post-stages (part 1) :[1]. Management Decision, 38(9), 649-661.

Week 4 Post by Paul

A Lack of Trust Hurts Facebook

Using an example from the current news headlines, the performance of Facebook's stock since their recent launch on the Nasdaq stock exchange reflects a lack of mutual trust. Their stock's performance has been far weaker than almost all experts predicted.

Part of the reason for weak stock performance was a technical problem with Nasdaq's servers on the launch date (Wood, 2012). That is not the primary cause for the low performing stock. A lack of trust in Facebook appears to be the primary reason.

Privacy is at the heart of trust. Facebook has often been accused of compromising its users' privacy (Levin, 2012). This compromise in maintaining privacy for its users has resulted in a general lack of trust in the company itself. "An exchange partner worthy of trust is one that will not exploit other's exchange vulnerabilities" (Barney & Hansen, 1994, p. 176).

Investors put their trust in a company when they invest in their stock. They are trusting that the company will grow and that will result in an increased stock price. This exchange of money and trust puts both parties in a vulnerable position (Barney & Hansen, 1994, p. 176). The investor will lose money when their stock investment loses value. The company will lose money when their investor liquidates their stock.

In addition to privacy issues in dealing with users' activity and data, Facebook has been accused of taking that private data and making it available to app makers and the general public (Levin, 2012). Data given to advertisers has been more than what was required for the apps they created to function (Levin, 2012).

In an attempt to improve investors' confidence in Facebook, CEO Mark Zuckerberg responded that "the company had made 'a bunch of mistakes'" (Levin, 2012). This was a case of too little, too late. Facebook's initial stock price of $38 a share has tumbled to $27 a share, as of this writing ("Mark Zuckerberg's wealth down $4.5 billion as Facebook tumbles on NASDAQ", 2012).

Wood, R. (2012). Want A Piece Of Nasdaq's $40M Facebook Settlement? Forbes. Retrieved fromhttp://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/09/want-a-piece-of-nasdaqs-40m-facebook-settlement/

Levin, A. (2012). Did Facebook's Privacy Problems Foretell the IPO? Huffington Post. Retrieved fromhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-levin/facebook-privacy-ipo_b_1580572.html

Barney, J. & Hansen, M. (1994). Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15, Winter, 175-190.

Mark Zuckerberg's wealth down $4.5 billion as Facebook tumbles on NASDAQ (2012). The Economic Times. Retrieved from http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international-business/mark-zuckerbergs-wealth-down-4-5-billion-as-facebook-tumbles-on-nasdaq/articleshow/13996850.cms

Week 4 post by Leslie

This week's readings highlighted the factors that drive companies to seek alliances and the mechanisms by which companies identify, court, and ultimately create successful partnerships with allies.

I was irresistibly reminded of a scholarly article I read last year about a failed Starbucks venture in China's Forbidden City. The Forbidden City location was just one of eighteen franchises licensed under a joint venture between Starbucks and China's Beijing Mei Da Coffee (Rae, 2000) -- and just one of over 400 locations to open in China between 1999 and 2006 -- but it caused such a "stir" (sorry; had to include a coffee pun) that its failure overshadowed Starbucks' success at other sites.

The article examines the conflict that ultimately forced the closure of the Forbidden City Starbucks through the theoretical framework of the "circuit of culture," with a particular focus on the role of new media in the controversy (Han & Zhang, 2009). Though the Forbidden City location prospered from the time of its opening in 2000 until 2007,  it ultimately "had to close down under tremendous public pressure" (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 395). Because the article's topic strays a bit far from our readings this week, I considered choosing another one instead. However, after some consideration, I decided that the lessons of our readings do apply, and it's up to me to illustrate the connections. Additionally, the article raises questions not sufficiently addressed in our readings that are worthy of discussion.

Several of our readings briefly address the importance of cultural integration in successful international alliances. Kanter, in particular, asserts that those involved in alliances must posses the "communication skills and cultural awareness to bridge their differences" (109). Yet all of the week's authors seemed to gloss over this seemingly important topic. While examining the Wal-Mart case study, I often found myself wondering how the retail giant would successfully bridge the gap between American and Indian consumer cultures (Bose, 2009). Cultural discord was certainly a key factor in the closing of the Forbidden City Starbucks (Han & Zhang, 2009).

Starbucks does attempt to "localize its brand to fit into the mainstream Chinese culture" (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 398) in most of its Chinese locations. But in a baffling display of shortsightedness, Starbucks failed to sufficiently consider Chinese customs in its Forbidden City location. For example, since Chinese people "experience coffee as a social event rather than daily necessity" and "come to Starbucks to socialize," Starbucks typically increases the size of its Chinese stores to make room for these lengthy customer interactions (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 298).  But the diminutive Forbidden City location contained just two cafe tables and a handful of chairs (Kotha & Glassman, 2003, p. 12). Han and Zhang inform us that Chinese consumers see Starbucks as representing Western fast food values and modernity, an image that may be viewed by some Chinese as "an object of attack" against traditional customs (2009, p. 298). Reducing the Forbidden City store to a two-table kiosk only reinforced this view of Starbucks as mere fast food.

The authors also describe the supremely sacred nature of the Forbidden City site, with its artful embodiment of 5000 years of Chinese history "that showcases the wonder and splendor of China's past" (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 297). Such a locale may have been an inappropriate location for a Starbucks store of any size, as "the presence of any foreign brands or products in this place may imply invasion of the Western culture assisted by Western corporate power" (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 298). 
Considering the increasingly global nature of business, greater attention should be placed on the cultural dimension of business alliances. How should consideration of culture inform the way companies choose partners? Might a different partner have advised Starbucks on the cultural implications of opening a location in the Forbidden City? 

Our readings also review the kinds of contracts used by firms to formalize their alliances over time (Gulati, 1998). After "news media and legislators jointly intensified their pressure" on the Forbidden City's management, Starbucks was given the option to sell "their coffee only under the 'Forbidden City' brand" or exit the Forbidden City altogether (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 399). Ultimately, Starbucks decided to terminate its contract with Forbidden City management and close shop (Hang & Zhang, 2009). This brought to mind Barney and Hansen's article on "Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage." I found myself imagining that the Starbucks-Beijing Mei Da Coffee alliance must be characterized by "semi-strong form trust," a form of trust built by the protection of parties through governance (Barney & Jansen, 1994, p. 177). One at least hopes that Starbucks' contract allowed it to escape from a no-win situation relatively unscathed.

Finally, I wish to address a seeming gap in our survey of business alliances. The crusade to close the Forbidden City Starbucks was ignited by the personal blog entry of a Chinese newscaster and media celebrity (Han & Zhang, 2009). In short order, "thousands of Chinese Internet users participated in a Web-based campaign" calling for the store to close (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 395). In today's Web-facilitated environment -- where "a personal blog can be influential and affect the business of multinational corporations or organizations" (Han & Zhang, 2009, p. 400) -- how important is it for businesses to consider public perception in choosing, forming and transacting alliances?

References

Barney, J. B., & Hansen, M. H. (1994). Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal (15), 175-190.

Bose, I. (2009). Wal-Mart and Bharti: Transforming retail in India. Asia Case Research Centre. pp. 1-18 (full article)

Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and networks. Strategic Management Journal (19), 293-317. 

Han, G., & Zhang, A. (2009). Starbucks is forbidden in the Forbidden City: Blog, circuit of culture and informal public relations campaign in China. Public Relations Review 35(2), 395-401. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.07.004

Kanter, R. (2010). Collaborative advantage: The art of alliances. Harvard Business Review. pp. 1-16. (full article)

Kotha, S., & Glassman, D. (2003). Starbucks Corporation: Competing in a global market. University of Washington Business School.  pp. 1-26 (full article)

Rae, S. (2000, November 2). Beijing's franchise revolution. The American Chamber of Commerce People's Republic of China. Retrieved from: http://www.amchamchina.org/article/5786

GlaxoSmithKline joint venture to vaccinate Japan

This week’s reading was another opportunity to acquire more knowledge about a subject, in this case International Alliances. After the awareness you then realize how often you see these types of business transactions and alliances around you all the time but now you have an idea of how it all happens. After analyzing the Wal-Mart/Bharti joint venture, I started searching for other organizations, in 2012, going through similar alliances. Good solid companies in the US joint venturing with solid companies abroad are actually all too common. My most recent finding was through an article in the International Business Times by Bhaskar Prasad, regarding the joint venture between the world’s second largest pharmaceutical firm *GlaxoSmithKline and Japan’s third largest pharmaceutical firm **Daiichi Sankyo (March, 2012).

This article shows similarities to the Wal-Mart Bharti venture. GlaxoSmithKline, a $27 Billion global firm creates a 50-50 joint venture with a $1.6 Billion firm in Japan “to build their presence in a key growth market, creating the first and largest company dedicated solely to vaccines in Japan” stated Christophe Weber, president designate of GlaxoSmithKline Vaccines. The objective of the joint venture will be to bring together the products and technologies of the two companies (Prasad, March, 2012). This joint venture host the three important components that make up the best agreements described by (Kanter,1994): First, they incorporate a specific joint activity – GlaxoSmithKline/Daiichi Sankyo will together develop vaccines in Japan through the joint venture. Second, a commitment to expand the relationship – both companies in the GSK/DS alliance will make a capital investment in the joint venture in preparation for future discoveries and developments, and Third, incorporate clear signs of continuing independence for all partners – in addition to the joint venture both firms in the GSK/DS alliance maintain their own operations and product lines globally.

GlaxoSmithKline and Daiichi Sanko have worked together before but solidifying this joint venture proves that both parties are strong form trustworthy firms (Barney & Hansen, 1994) confident that any vulnerabilities that may exist will not be exploited by either one. Representing the equity ownership concept (Gomes-Casseres, 1993) both firms decided to name the new joint venture Japan Vaccine Co. (Prasad, 2012) splitting the joint venture profits 50/50 with a portion going toward funding ongoing capital needs of the venture and expanding the venture as new vaccines in the JV development pipeline are approved (GSK press, 2012).

I believe the joint venture with GSK/DS will be a good one. They are two good companies committed to improving the quality of human life and growing their model by one growth market at a time and if nothing else, the world will benefit from the venture.

*GlaxoSmithKline is headquartered in England with a large presence in the US.

**Daiichi Sanko is based in the UK with a large presence in China.

Prasad, (March, 2012). Daiichi Sankyo, GlaxoSmithKline agree on joint venture in Japan, International Business Times.com, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/307811/20120301/daiichi-sankyo-glaxosmithkline-agree-joint-venture-japan.htm

Joyce & Schroter, (March, 2012). Daiichi Sankyo, GSK sign vaccine pact, Wall Street Journal.com, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203753704577256904175147144.html

Gomes-Casseres, (1993). "Managing International Alliances: A Conceptual

Framework." Harvard Business School. pp. 1-20.

Barney & Hansen, (1994). "Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive Advantage." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 175-190.

Kanter, R. (2010). "Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances."Harvard Business Review. p.106.

Week 4 post by Andrew

This week’s readings on organizational partnerships provoked a lot of thought on how partners are selected and why certain partnerships succeed while other ones fail.

Looking at the framework outlined by Kanter (1994) regarding “eight I’s that create successful We’s” (p. 100), for this week’s application assignment I chose to examine the partnership between All Weather Architectural, a Phoenix-based glass-tempering company and Santelli Tempered Glass, a Pittsburgh-based start-up in the field to form All Weather Pittsburgh in 2006, particularly the partnership between the companies’ two presidents, Lance Porter and Joe Santelli. (In the interest of full disclosure: Joe Santelli is my father and I have served as a communication consultant to his company since it was launched.)

The joint venture known as All Weather Pittsburgh set out to combine Porter and Santelli’s individual excellence. For Porter, this was a groundbreaking method to deliver tempered glass (often known as safety glass) to residential window manufacturers with high quality and timely service due to a heavy emphasis on automation technology, but heretofore only put in place in the western markets of the U.S. For Santelli, the strength was the knowledge of the east coast markets serviceable from Pittsburgh and a career’s worth of experience and contacts gained in the glass industry.

When it came to importance, each shared the same major strategic objectives.

“Our long-term goals were to reproduce success in a new geographic area; being able to produce the amount of profit; do it with the same brand name (All Weather) to spread the company’s reputation nationwide,” Santelli said. (The company has since changed the name to Santelli Tempered Glass.)

Each of Porter and Santelli’s strengths also meant they had strong interdependence, Santelli explained. “What Lance had on the west coast was experience dealing with window companies and long-term success. What I had was my sales ability and network of window companies to explain the sales and service strengths of the venture. Lance had all three qualities we needed in his product up and running out west: price, timeliness of service and quality due to a lack of human error.”

Kanter states that partners “invest in each other…to demonstrate their respective stakes in the relationship and each other” (p. 100). For Porter, this was a $1.5m piece of equipment he was willing to put into the new venture in exchange for a minority partnership, with Santelli willing to invest financially in addition to a commitment to running the operation.

When asked about the exchange of information, Santelli said “this was probably the most important element; [Porter] established how much glass could be tempered in an 8-hour period, the amount of labor needed and the price it could sell for. He came to Pittsburgh to start the process and then we would communicate by e-mail and telephone daily to troubleshoot.”

On the subject of integration, “Partners become both teachers and learners,” says Kanter (1994). In the Porter-Santelli partnership, this integration took place with Porter educating the Pittsburgh staff on the technicalities of the automated tempering process, with Santelli taking the lead on strategizing how to best take advantage of the factory’s location. Within 300 miles of Pittsburgh were 100 million people, a much higher concentration of potential end-users of the company’s glass than in Porter’s western operation.

Santelli and Porter institutionalized their decision-making process in the same way as the investment, with Porter serving as an advisor and Santelli having final authority. As Santelli explained, “He basically would let me make my own mistakes. He was a role model, given his experience, but let me do my own thing given the east coast market. It wound up a fairly even split, between me making mistakes and me being correct.”

The eight I of Kanter’s characteristics, integrity, was the most vital, according to Santelli.

“Trust is really the key to the successful partnership,” he said.

“Honest communication between the partners is as important as anything you do. If you’re not being as successful as you could be, you need to tell them that. If you don’t and the numbers come out a few weeks later, it’s much more difficult to re-establish that trust. Your partner can advise, suggest, or share that experience to help you turn things around.”

References

Kanter, R. (1994) "Collaborative advantage: the art of alliances." Harvard Business Review, pp. 96-111.