Sellnow and Ulmer (2000) offer a
case study of the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak; their study examined
the ethical implications of strategic ambiguity in a crisis communications
situation. As background, in 1993,
several children became ill with E. coli in the northwest U.S., hundreds were
sickened and several small children died (Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000). Jack in the Box hamburgers were implicated as
the cause, consequently, Jack in the Box stock plunged as the company looked to
identify causes of the outbreak (Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000).
Sellnow and Ulmer’s (2000) research
examined the language used by the company with the media during the crisis and
the company’s testimony delivered by its president before a U.S. Senate
subcommittee. They found that in that
testimony, the president uses ambiguous language interpreted as an effort to
escape sole blame for the incident. His
language includes, “not solely responsible,” suggests that government
standards, “didn’t reach his office…” and similar language to deflect direct responsibility
(Sellnow & Ulmer, 2000, p. 150).
This article offered a unique
perspective on this week’s assigned readings, where strategic ambiguity is
offered as a powerful tool that organizations can deploy to accomplish
organizational goals (Eisenberg, 1984). Eisenberg
cautions against the use of ambiguity for
In this case, Jack in the Box used
strategic ambiguity not to “…foster agreement on abstractions without limiting
specific interpretations” (Eisenberg, 1984, p 231), but to avoid making statements
that could be used in litigation by individuals affected by the E. coli. Sellnow and Ulmer (2000) conclude that Jack in
the Box used strategic ambiguity to favor financial stakeholders over others,
and in this manner, strategic ambiguity was used unethically (p. 149).
References
Eisenberg,
E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as
strategy in organizational communication. Communication
Monographs, 51, 227-242.
Sellnow,
T., & Ulmer, R., (2000). Consistent questions
of ambiguity in organizational crisis communication: Jack In the Box as a case study.
Journal of Business Ethics, 25.
143-155.
Great issues here ... when does disclosure become a moral imperative? I think when a crisis is just breaking it's sometimes hard to know, in that moment, that a crisis is at hand. BP thought they could quickly defuse the Gulf oil leak, so they kept mum. Epistemology: how do we know what we know? It takes time for word to get around and for the crisis reaction to engage. Bush in the classroom on the morning of 9/11, for instance. But when an outbreak is at hand and lives are at stake, as in the Jack in the Box case, the withholding of information implies culpability. Most corporations have learned that lesson. Or one would hope. Strategic ambiguity doesn't equal concealment.
ReplyDeleteHi Cynthia,
ReplyDeleteI read this week's readings wondering don't companies use strategic ambiguity, or as Will points, out politicians (I think we can call politicians organizations and not people at this point) as the norm and then is ratcheted up for a crisis, like BP and the oil spill, unless, it's promoting something positive? As it was pointed out in "When Social Issues become Strategic" in the McKinsley Quarterly, BP wanted to be active in working on finding a solution to global warming, or not being as much of a cause, and they came out and said it.
Or one that is more recent is Burger King and other fast food chain's recent announcements that they will no longer use stall-kept pigs in their food products. The communication that they were doing something good now wasn't ambiguous, but try to find a statement that using stall-kept pigs wasn't good and/or that they made a mistake.
What was Jack in the Box's immediate response to this crisis? Did they warn the public and pull the infected hamburger patties? I agree with Will that it is dangerous for an organization to take sole responsibility without knowing all the facts of the case. That being said, the organization has a duty to protect the public from any further harm. Tylenol did a good job of this when someone was tampering with their product; they pulled everything off the shelves until they got some answers. Once the public is no longer in danger, do you think an organization should use strategic ambiguity until they are certain of a cause?
ReplyDeleteJack in the Box's immediate response (and according to the article it built over weeks, so using that framework for "immediate), was really wait and see and evaluate. Tylenol is (and probably always will be) the poster child for great response to a crisis.
DeleteI'm actually amazed that when I was having trouble finding a good case study on strategic ambiguity, I didn't think of the most obvious place of all: court cases involving corporate defendants.
ReplyDeleteThe Tylenol example is one that always sticks in my mind as the complete opposite of strategic ambiguity and is often taught in crisis communication classes. Tylenol maintained integrity and credibility after a potentially disastrous crisis. How do you think they would've fared had they opted for strategic ambiguity in place of extreme caution and disclosure?
Cynthia,
ReplyDeleteYour post and the subsequent dialogue about strategic ambiguity in crisis communications scenarios prompted me to dig up an article I photocopied out of the New York Times a couple of years ago called "In Case of Emergency: What Not to Do." The article covers two of the crises we've addressed in the conversation here, describing Johnson & Johnson's mass recall of Tylenol as "Exhibit A in the lesson book on forthright crisis management" and ruing the transformation of BP from "the energy giant... which once packaged itself as an environmental visionary" to "progenitor of the worst oil spill in American history" (Goodman, 2010).
I know crisis communications was not really the point of this module, but I think the connection between the intended topic and crisis management is an important one. The article offers some very interesting point/counterpoint opinions on whether companies should step right out to take responsibility with full disclosure or "absorb the pounding and get back to business" (Goodman, 2010).
Another crisis featured in the story is Toyota's problem with vehicles accelerating themselves into accidents. Toyota "wrestled internally with how much to disclose" and used "carefully calibrated language" (Goodman, 2010). I think it could be argued that Toyota employed the approach Eisenberg meant for long-term strategy to short-term damage-control tactics.
Here's a link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/business/22crisis.html?pagewanted=all
References
Goodman, P. S. (2010, August 22). In case of emergency: What not to do. The New York Times, pp. BU1. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com
As a former spokesman for a school district, I found that the more ambiguous we were in disseminating information that could be considered bad news (low scores, dropout rates high, etc) very often upset the community at-large. And hint of deflection and we were in for a lot of public ridicule. I never had an issue just coming out and being completely transparent (especially because this was a public school district in which the community (taxes, bond elections, etc.) is a key stakeholder. Admitting faults or shortcomings and offering solutions helps calm people down really quick.
ReplyDelete