Ambiguity as a strategy does seem a bit obvious – especially
when you think about politics, king making, and ruling leaders throughout
history, and does anyone really understand what antiquity-period Greeks and Romans were
talking about, possibly the best at ambiguity? Finding the article “Ambiguity as a
Communication Strategy in the WCTU: National and North Dakota” (Wurtz, 1995)
though, an article about the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) using
ambiguity as strategy in the early part of the 20th century, seemed
out of place. It seemed out of place because it’s easy to think of the rigidity
of that era. It may be out of place as the definition of ambiguity as strategy
is more current, and that the WCTU may have been ahead of its time.
One of the strategies he WCTU, according to Wurtz (1995, p. 35-36), used was letter
writing in its recruitment of new members. WCTU members were encouraged to use
their ideas and language to attract new members (Wurtz, 1995). Thus, members
were able to learn and use the best methods for those they were targeting. It
also demonstrates that the WCTU knew that no matter how they reached their
audience, they knew they were reaching their audience, and that would allow the
audience to think for themselves and draw their own conclusions, like they knew
that communication is in context (Eisenberg, 1984, p. 229).
This ambiguity is in line with Eisenberg’s (1984, p. 229) “relativist
position:” Ideas were decided by WCTU communicators, and those the WCTU
targeted were left to interpret the message and decide if they wanted to join.
Wurtz writes that messages are not written literally and
allow for those that receive them to interpret them how they wish (1995, p.
36), and that this allowed the WCTU greater access at recruiting and
influencing. This ambiguity in communication allowed the WCTU to communicate
and relate with the variety of people that is America – the South in the early
20th century was much different than the Northeast.
It’s as if the WCTU were following Goodall, Trethewey, and
McDonald’s (2006, p. 10) “five pragmatic principles to guide policy,” that they
knew to “engage” instead of sell their ideas, let their message be delivered
from a variety of sources while expecting different results, that they didn’t
understand everyone from every corner of the U.S., that understanding is more
about “a function of relationships” than using the correct words, and that you
can unify through diversity if you have a shared and common interest and that
it is better to bring people together for a positive (influence change) than a negative (complain and do nothing).
Wurtz writes that the WCTU used their ambiguity and
“storytelling” (1995, p. 36-37) to grow the organization, using stories to attract new members. The way that Wurtz describes
the use of “storytelling” makes it sound like the WCTU knew how to create a
club that a woman would want to join, therefore making it sound important and
prestigious so that it could achieve its goals and be successful.
References
Eisenberg, E. (1984) Ambiguity As Strategy In Organizational Communication, Communication Monographs, 51, pp.227-242 (full article).
Goodall,
B., Terthewey, A., and McDonald, K. (2006) Strategic Ambiguity, Communication
and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices, Consortium
for Strategic Communication, pp. 1-14 (full article).
Wurtz,
L. (1995). Ambiguity as a communications strategy in the WCTU: national and
North Dakota. North Dakota Journal of
Speech & Theatre. 8(1),
34-42.
Justin, do you think deniability was a motivating factor for using strategic ambiguity by this movement? They were promoting the evils of alcohol, and knowing our country's history, that might not have been a very popular sentiment. Also, did this article give some examples of their strategic ambiguity? That might be helpful for class discussion.
ReplyDeleteI didn't think about the historical context at the time. Thinking of that now, yes, the letter writing campaign that Wurtz writes about that was used to recruit new members “allowed for the flexibility and versatility to succeed" in reaching out for new members -- it's Mohr's (1983) idea from the Eisenberg reading that ambiguity and "inconsistency" can drive "creativity and flexibility" (230). Having WCTU members create their own communication under the umbrella of WCTU beliefs instead of one unified message probably allowed the WCTU members to reach a broader audience.
ReplyDeleteWurtz states that ambiguity provided deniability if WCTU didn't succeed in its goals (38). Ambiguity as a strategy also allowed the WCTU to have multiple platforms or as what they called the "Do Everything" policy (p. 39). By not stating here is what we advocate, it allowed different groups and locations within the WCTU latitude to pick its causes.
I just found what I had been looking for in Eisenberg on page 233. The WCTU's use of letter writing was an example, to me at least, of the interpersonal relationship that allows the meaning of the message to be filled in by the audience. Except the WCTU allowed the messengers to fill it for the WCTU and then have that message interpreted by those on the audience. It really allowed the WCTU to take a hands-off approach to its communication and message.
ReplyDeleteInteresting post, Justin, on a historical period often forgotten. The WCTU certainly seemed to have been able to use ambiguity to draw members to their cause, in this instance leaving the letter's recipient to fill in the "rest of the story" with their own thoughts. This likely proved key, as the recipients could see themselves in the story and thus more easily in the organization.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if modern political campaigns can trace origins back to this group; often we hear campaigns that define more clearly what they are against than what they are for, leaving the potential voter to assign their own meaning to the candidate.