Strategic
Ambiguity in U.S. Messaging in Afghanistan
At dawn on
Halloween morning, October 31, 2011, a coordinated insurgent attack was
launched against our compound in Kandahar City, one involving rocket-propelled
grenades, suicide bombers and the detonation of a vehicle-borne IED outside the
compound wall. The breach was unsuccessful, leading to a six-hour gun battle
between the insurgents and our security team. Five Afghan civilians died in the
attack. None of our personnel were wounded.
While the
attack was still ongoing, the following press release appeared on the Taliban’s
Voice of Jihad
website:
KANDAHAR,
Oct. 31 – Officials from Kandahar state that the fighting which erupted this
morning when a number of martyrdom-seeking Mujahideen entered the IRD building
of foreign invaders after blowing away all security barriers with a truck bomb
is still ongoing.
The
martyrdom-seeking Mujahideen add that they initially went to each of the rooms
in the building, killing all the enemy personnel inside using their weapons and
even machetes, and after a long while took up positions inside the building and
targeted the enemy troops arriving for reinforcement.
According
to witnesses, the IRD building has also been badly damaged by the powerful
blast, bringing down a number of rooms as well as destroying and damaging the
enemy military and logistical vehicles inside.
None of
this happened, of course. But the report was erroneously carried by several
news outlets during the first hours of the attack and picked up on numerous
Tweets, creating the desired local chaos and misinformation.
As noted by Goodall et al. (2006), “the
jihadi media and message strategy … has thus far dominated local cultural interpretations
of U.S. diplomatic objectives” (p. 4). The authors go on to suggest that
strategic ambiguity may serve as an antidote to the growing proliferation of
jihadi media.
One example of strategic ambiguity that I’ve
noted in my work here is expressed in two of the authors’ Principles to Guide
Policy: Do not seek to control a message’s meaning in cultures we do not
fully understand and Focus diplomatic efforts on building trust and credibility. The mission in Afghanistan is one of
stabilization, creating an environment upon which a thriving economy can be
built and legitimate governance can flourish. To achieve this aim, U.S.
stabilization efforts reach out to farmers, who comprise 80% of the Afghan
workforce. Messaging is critical, but the approach is not one of building
American prestige so much as buttressing the Afghan government. In other
circumstances, American intervention is clearly labeled: From the American
People.
Here, no such branding takes place. American relief is directed through Afghan
governmental channels to help build confidence in the Afghans for their
government. By giving credit to the Afghan government, taxpayer-funded relief
may not win the hearts of Afghans to the American cause, but it achieves the
strategic goal of building stabilization, which is in the American interests.
Previous efforts to inculcate goodwill through
pro-American propaganda have failed miserably here, serving as illustrations of
the disconnect between message content and receiver interpretation as noted by
Eisenberg (1984). And the jihadi movement will no doubt continue to be
relentless in its own rollout of propaganda. But strategic ambiguity—in this
case, routing the messaging indirectly through Afghan channels—might possibly hold the key
to longer-term solutions in a country where messaging is so easily mishandled
and where trust is so hard-won.
-----------------------
Reference:
Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in
organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51, 227-242.
Goodall, B., Terthewey, A., and
McDonald, K. (2006) Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in
an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices. Consortium for Strategic
Communication, report #604, 1-14
Very interesting post, Will. If the citizens of Afghanistan knew that this aid was actually backed by the U.S. and was not coming directly from the Afghan government do you think the message of a strong, stable government would be undermined? Or would that add some pro-U.S. sentiment?
ReplyDeleteMost Afghans see through the deception. They know their district governments are weak and corrupt. I think the idea is more to create the physical linkage -- getting them to the District Center to pick up their vegetable seed, meeting the government officials, etc. Most don't even know where these places. So even though the "Afghan face" is a pretty thin veneer, there are benefits to the physical act of going to the district offices. And because most know the U.S. provides these inputs, it provides something of a counterweight to the seething resentment most feel at the foreign occupation.
DeleteSounds like a crazy Halloween! Aside from causing chaos while the real story plays out, what sort of long-term effects do the fallacious reports have on the locals? Do they eventually come to learn the truth? and if so does it weaken their trust in media outlets, reminiscent of the boy who cried wolf?
ReplyDeleteNik - I just ran this question by my wise assistant. He tells me that most Afghans ignore what the Taliban have to say, or at best, take it with a grain of salt. Sometimes the Taliban report on things that ISAF/NATO try to keep hushed, so they aren't ignored entirely. But a lot of the time they provide completely misrepresentative information (i.e. 22 Afghans die in a bomb blast, but the Taliban report the casualties as all foreigners). Eventually word gets round through the gov't and private media outlets.
DeleteHi Will,
ReplyDeleteYour description of the jihadi media and then answer to Nik's question pointed me back to principle 1 in the "Strategic Communication and Strategic Ambiguity in the Middle East: Principles and Practices" reading. The first principle that is listed is "practice strategic engagement, not global salesmanship." It sounds like the jihadi media is attempting to sell their cause and victory and you state the Afghans ignore or take the report with "a grain of salt." Are both sides losing this communication battle due to poor strategy, might the U.S. and jihadi media find more success by following a more ambiguous approach?
The U.S. could stand to do a LOT more capacity building within the Afghan media, teach them how to tell their story. The Taliban could certainly stand a bit more ambiguity, but that's something of an alien concept here. People don't always respond to subtlety. Messaging here is the equivalent of a stick in the eye.
DeleteKeeping the volatility of the Afghan government in mind, do you think that from an American strategic perspective, there is a better option than trying to build confidence and trust in this fragile infrastructure? Is there consistency in government faith (no pun intended) when personnel turn over for whatever reason?
ReplyDeleteI think building confidence in the Afghan government is a good course of action, but I don't know if doling out freebies and pretending to the farmers that it comes from their District Governors is the best course of action. Better would be to don the work gloves and try to make the government work. But the corruption is so endemic, I have a hard time imagining how this could be done.
ReplyDeleteAs I was reading Goodall, Terthewey and McDonald (2006), I understand that there's an official US government communications policy, but how do the Afghan's interpret or make sense of the many voices they hear coming out of the U.S. media. While the Administration may say one thing, there are so many voices who interpret for their own purposes those words differently and air them as news. It often confuses me what is real, I imagine the ambiguity is increased when heard or read through the lens of a different language or culture.
ReplyDelete