Strategic
Communication and National Security
Joint Force Quarterly
After reading Stavridis’ (2007) journal article, I thought that it
would be most valuable to focus on one particular case study mentioned
regarding a strategic communication plan launched by the Department of Defense
(DOD) in response to allegations of torture during force-feeding operations at
the Guantanamo Bay detention and interrogation facility.
In 2005, detainees began a “large, coordinated hunger
strike” (Stavridis, 2007, p. 4) and were eventually locked into restraint chairs
and force fed through tubes inserted through their nostrils down to their
stomachs; allegations of torture surfaced shortly after (Stavridis, 2007).
The DOD has a policy of preserving life, and in the view of
Guantanamo Bay officials, force-feeding operations were a necessary response to
life-threatening emergencies (Stavridis, 2007). Following implementation of
these procedures, the DOD experienced significant, unforeseen negative public
response, especially in regard to the restraint chair, which was called
“torture,” yet was an essential part of the feedings (Stavridis, 2007) to
ensure the safety of everyone involved. As Bonini et all (2006, p. 21) stated,
social and political forces “can alter an industry (or in this course, an
organization’s) strategic landscape fundamentally.” In this case, social forces
did just that.
In response to public outcry, misrepresentation of the
procedure and the bad press that came with it, the DOD was forced to reevaluate
its communication tactics and implement a strategic communication plan to
offset the growing belief that it was being deceptive (Stavridis, 2007). As part of this plan, the DOD:
·
Invited distinguished physicians to observe
force-feeding procedures. These physicians then published credible journal
articles on the procedure.
·
Stressed importance of saving human lives and
the fact that identical procedures were used in accredited prisons. These
became key messages.
·
Made facility officials available to the media,
making the process and organization more transparent.
Additionally, the procedure was performed, voluntarily, of
course, on the task force joint commander so he could accurately and appropriately
speak to the fact that it was not torture
(Stavridis, 2007), increasing credibility and gaining approval and trust of
message recipients (Argenti et all, 2005). Eventually, negative publicity dwindled
and detainees began voluntarily eating again (Stavridis, 2007).
In this case, the DOD used an integrated approach to
strategic communications involving media relations, employee communications,
community relations and government relations to accomplish its goal of calming
public outrage and negative press (Stavridis, 2007, Argenti et all, 2005) and
by involving senior management, in this case, the joint commander (Argenti et
all, 2005) credibility was improved among constituents and the media, leading
to a small victory in an ongoing battle to shape public opinion (Stavridis,
2007).
References
Argenti, P., Howell, R., Beck, K. (2005). The strategic
communication imperative. MIT Sloan Management
Review, 46(3), 83-89.
Bonini, S.M.J., Mendonca, L., Oppenheim, J. (2006). When
social issues become strategic. The McKinsey
Quarterly, 2, 19-31.
Stavridis, J. (2007). Strategic communication and national security. Joint Force Quarterly, 46, 4-7.
Interesting example, Brian. As you mentioned, Bonini, Mendonca, and Oppenheim (2006) wrote that organizations should monitor the current sociopolitical climate so they have a better understanding of what issues will become salient. Do you think the DOD could have been more proactive about tracking how the definition of torture was coming to the forefront of public discussion? Could they have foreseen the backlash against this procedure?
ReplyDeleteTo be honest, I was pretty surprised that the DOD was so reactive in this situation. I'm not sure that the DOD could've anticipated that the chair itself would be considered torture, but I think that it would've been reasonable to assume that someone, somewhere would cry foul at some part of the process. Hindsight is always 20/20, but in a situation where delicate circumstances like religion are involved, I think that the DOD absolutely should've been more proactive in rolling out a strategic communication plan. I'm sure there's a standard operating procedure now!
ReplyDeleteAs usual, and as pointed out in Goodall et al., the government is often behind the curve when it comes to proactive PR. Did the DOD really fail to see the bad PR possibilities of the restraint chair? If I had been in charge of Guantanamo communications I would have said, okay folks, before we forcibly shove food down the nostrils of these prisoners, we need to let the public know that we have a problem on our hands. Hold a press conference, to wit, "our prisoners are trying to kill ourselves, and we have a problem on our hands." Establish the problem before implementing a solution that might have bad blow-back. Then no one can accuse you of anything deceptive. "We told you people we had a problem, and this is how we went about resolving it, for the survival of our inmates."
ReplyDeleteIf not a chair than what would be the safe alternative? Lying down would certainly increase the potential for choking. This is one of those cases where you're literally damned if you do and you're damned if you don't. I agree that there should have been a strategic plan for communication and I'd be inclined to use the word "humane" as much as possible. But again, to many people, any justification or proof that no torture was involved, Gitmo should have never been opened in the first place.
ReplyDelete